One of the fundamental objectives and challenges in coaching is actually very similar to those for point guards in basketball and quarterbacks in football: make sure the rest of the team gets their best opportunity to succeed.

In football, that can manifest itself as a QB making sure he throws the ball in a place the receiver can catch it with space to run after the catch and a minimal chance of getting clobbered at the point of the catch. In basketball, point guards like Steve Nash make countless nuanced decisions with the idea of getting the ball to certain players in the right spots to both maximize their chances to score points (and get hot) while also avoiding giving them the ball in places on the floor which could cause problems given their abilities and tendencies. Basketball coaches go through these endeavors in a similar yet meaningfully different way since a part of their job is figuring out who should be on the floor as well as how the offense and defense should run. This requires cohesion of strategy and personnel, communication with the players and staff, and the creative flexibility to adjust all of those components to changing situations within a game or season.

Every once in a while, a decision (or series of them) leaves me absolutely dumbfounded. One of these circumstances happened last Tuesday when the Warriors hosted the Oklahoma City Thunder. Monta Ellis dominated the game offensively with 48 points while David Lee earned his second career triple double. After a Kevin Durant bank shot that put the Thunder up by one, Jackson and his staff had a play to draw up down one with fourteen seconds to go on the clock. Thankfully, they did not do an isolation play for Monta (or EllISO, as I call it), instead electing for a pick-and-roll for Lee and Ellis. After generating a seemingly open path to the hoop, Lee elected to draw in the defense and kick the ball to Monta for a fairly open three. Despite the logical problems of giving up at least a tie and likely the lead for a deep shot like that (for Monta Ellis, who has the worst three-point shooting % of any top-20 scorer who shoots more than one three per game - 27%), Jackson embraced the outcome since Ellis had been dominant in the game. By itself, that seems fine beyond the flaws of shooting a three down one point coupled with the fact that Lee had a great look.

However, the missed three and subsequent Oklahoma City free throws gave Golden State another bite at the apple in the contest. In his post-game presser, Jackson expressed his belief that 1.1 seconds was insufficient to have the inbounder get the ball back and take a reasonable shot. Since the team trailed by three points, having shooters and facilitators like passers and screeners on the floor made complete sense. What made the play call remarkable was that the coaching staff put Ellis as the inbounder.

Now, as mentioned previously, Jackson told us after the game that he had zero expectation that the inbounder would get the shot- it was on the receiver to catch, create, and shoot the pivotal shot. As such, they made the conscious decision to have the one player on the floor who could not take the three-pointer be the player who he previously defended taking a three just thirteen seconds before since he was “hot.” Considering the minimal time that passed between events, there can be no cohesive explanation why the first shot was proper and part of the design while the second play directly takes him out of a similar shot.

Unfortunately, that sort of logical incoherence has plagued the Warriors in recent weeks. In that same post-Oklahoma City presser, Jackson was asked about Ellis’ shot selection in the first half (which was dubious at many times even as they went in). Without any hesitation, he replied “Great scorers make great shots” and “I’m fine with it- you want me to tell him to stop shooting? The guy had 48 tonight.”

The “it is what it is” seat of your pants-style analysis helps explain many of the team’s problems. Bad shots are bad shots regardless of whether they go in or not. The fact of the matter remained that Ellis shot on looks he should not have, and that is part of the reason he shoots a lower percentage than his compatriots near the top of the scoring list. When prompted with a teachable moment about shot selection that could have still maintained his praise of Ellis’ performance in the game, Jackson instead opted to question the questioner and defend his player because those shots happened to go in at a higher frequency that night.

This flawed philosophy also revealed itself in a beyond fascinating interview Jackson had with Matt Steinmetz, Marcus Thompson, and John Dickinson a few days before. After the Bench Mob game against Sacramento, Jackson fought vigorously against the concept of mixing and matching members of his first and second units. The most telling quote after being asked the question a few different ways was “When five guys play to the level that we expect on both sides of the basketball, then that day will come. But I’m not going to throw guys on the court because it’s time for them to go in.”

This defensive answer does not even respond directly to the question since it goes after the straw man that the reason mixing and matching happens is that “it’s time” for those players enter or leave the game- mixing and matching disregards that exact problem since it would be based on performance and fit rather than a timed rotation.

While Jackson has been a great ambassador for the organization and a good motivator for the team, the tactical basketball decision-making needs to improve greatly for this team to even sniff the elevated expectations both Jackson and owner Joe Lacob put on this year’s squad.