First off, congratulations to the Miami Heat on defending their crown and winning their second championship in a row. Also, congratulations to the San Antonio Spurs on being such a high-class organization and playing their hearts out in an extremely competitive seven-game series that will be remembered for years to come.

The two best teams in the NBA have given it their all these last two weeks, but unfortunately only one can rise up and stand in the spotlight in the end. And when we all thought it was the Spurs’ year on Tuesday night in Game 6, up five with 28 seconds to play and with the Larry O’Brien trophy and the yellow tape coming out, the Heat demonstrated a legendary will to win.

They refused to lose and were prepared to do whatever it took.

Prior to Game 6, we had noticed a trend that had developed: The winner of the points in the paint battle turned out to be the victor in that particular game.

Then, Games 6 and 7 happened, both Miami wins.

Not only did the Heat lose the battle in the paint in the two final games of the series, they got dominated.

In Game 6, the Spurs dominated the inside and outscored the Heat 60-32. In Game 7, they won again, this time 48-24.

In a few pieces during these Finals, we took a look at the shot selection of both teams and how efficient they were being from different areas of the floor.

In their Game 1 loss, 43.6 percent of the Heat’s offense came from the paint, where they shot 50 percent. They only lost the battle inside by six in this game. Their mid-range game only counted for 24.4 percent of their offense, but they were quite efficient from that area, shooting 47.4 percent. Their demise in that game? Their inefficiency from three-pointers above the break: 4-for-13 from an area that accounted for 16.7 percent of their offense.

Turning to their bounce-back win in Game 2, their offense from the inside accounted for 48.2 percent of their shots, converting on an 57.5 percent of their attempts. They rose victorious in the paint this time, winning by eight. 28.9 percent of their shots came from mid-range, and even though they only made 33.3 percent of their shots from that area, they were highly efficient from beyond the arc, shooting 55.6 percent from an area on the floor that allotted for 21.7 percent of their offense.  

In Game 3, they were blown out by 36. They lost the battle in the paint by eight this time. The Spurs deserve credit for forcing the Heat’s offense outside the paint and giving them inefficient, contested mid-range jumpers. 34.2 percent of Miami’s offense came from inside the paint in this game, down a whopping 14.9 percent from their average number of shots from that area in the first two games. However, they did convert at a 61.5 percent clip. The mid-range game is what killed them, accounting for 42.1 percent of their offense and converting on a poor 21.9 percent on those attempts.

We come to Game 4, where we see the trend continue: Miami wins the battle in the paint by 12 and win the game. They got back to what was producing wins for them, 44.7 percent of their offense coming from the inside and making a highly efficient 65.8 percent of their attempts. Even though a fairly high 41.1 percent of their offense came from mid-range, they were quite efficient from that area, hitting at a 45.7 percent clip. They only made three three-pointers in that game, and that was enough as it was not needed considering their production from the other areas on the floor.

The series now a best-of-three, it was in both teams‘ interests to go up 3-2, especially for San Antonio, who would have to close out the series at the American Airlines Arena, a tough task in the NBA Finals. 50 percent of the Heat’s offense came from inside the paint, where they lost the battle by 10, hitting at a 46.5 percent clip. They could not depend on their mid-range game, shooting an even 30 percent from that area even though they only took 23.3 percent of their total shots from there. They hit 11 threes, making them 47.8 percent of the time, which is very good. No surprise that they did not get blown out by 36 this time, only losing by 10.

With two games left, the Spurs went into Game 6 with a chance to end the series. Miami lost the battle in the paint for the second game in a row, this time by a high margin, and with 28 seconds left to play, they were highly expected to lose the game. 43.2 percent of their offense came from the inside, converting on 51.4 percent of those attempts. Once again they were inefficient from mid-range, shooting 33.3 percent from an area that accounted for 33.3 percent of their offense. Shooting 57.9 from beyond the arc definitely helped them catch the Spurs by surprise to steal the game in overtime. We all know the storyline behind what is now one of the greatest games in NBA history. It’s also worth noting that Miami played extremely well defensively in the second half, limiting San Antonio to just 35 percent shooting.

The story in Game 7 resembles Game 6 in that the Spurs blew out the Heat in the battle in the paint. Miami’s shot attempts from the inside accounted for a feeble 22.6 percent of their offense, but they did produce well, hitting 63.2 percent of those attempts. The mid-range game accounted for 36.9 percent of their offense, and they were not too efficient from there, knocking down 38.7 percent of those shots. However, LeBron James and Dwyane Wade were the ones scoring well from that area, hitting at a 43.5 percent clip combined. The Heat launched 32 shots from long-range, their most in any game this series, and knocked down a respectable 37.5 percent. The story for Miami? Shane Battier and James shooting a combined 61 percent from beyond the arc to sink 11 three-pointers. According to ESPN Stats & Info, “87 percent of [James’] FGAs tonight are outside the paint, his highest percentage outside the paint in any game in his Heat career.” He hit 45 percent of his shots from outside the paint, including a go-ahead jumper with 27 seconds left in the game to put his team up by four.

So what happened after Game 5 that allowed Miami to win two games while getting slaughtered in the paint-battle?

Basically, the Heat decided to cut down on their double-teams in the paint and trusted their bigs in Chris Bosh and Chris Andersen to defend Tim Duncan and any penetration in the paint as best they can, and it paid off. In Games 6 and 7 combined, the Spurs ended up shooting an atrocious 9.4 percent from mid-range and an ugly 29.7 percent from long-range after having shot 38 percent from mid-range and a mind-boggling 44.2 percent from beyond the arc the first five games, as the Heat was now covering San Antonio’s shooters without sagging off to help on the lane-penetration or post-up play.

In the end, everything came down to the last 48 minutes of play in the season, and Miami did not settle for second-place. A historic 66-win season, including 27 straight, has been capped off with a championship, their second in a row, and every player and staff member has earned every single second of rest that is coming their way this summer.