Imagine you’re about to make a major decision that will shape the course of your life and one of your biggest rivals inadvertently blocks it because they’re a little too fearful of your brilliance.

James Dolan had too much respect for Masai Ujiri’s jumper. The sound of Ujiri getting all net on him for a third time was too dodgy a proposition for Dolan and the Toronto Raptors were inadvertently given the opportunity to hand over the team to Kyle Lowry and see how formidable a young roster without a traditional superstar could become in a depleted conference.

The direction of an NBA franchise rarely hinges so profoundly on a non-move made in December. It happens during a few minutes in mid-May in New Jersey during the lottery, but it’s usually the moves you make that define you instead of the ones that end up in the trash bin of what-ifs.

Trading away Rudy Gay a year ago, who was using a higher percentage of his team’s possessions than Carmelo Anthony, Kevin Durant and Carmelo Anthony, gave both Lowry and DeMar DeRozan the ability to have the ball more, while giving Terrence Ross substantially more minutes as a complementary piece. The Raptors also bolstered a thin bench with the pieces they acquired from the Sacramento Kings in Greivis Vasquez, Patrick Patterson, Chuck Hayes and John Salmons. Vasquez was re-signed in the offseason and Salmons was flipped to acquire bench scorer extraordinaire Lou Williams.

In the days following the Gay trade, Ujiri was eagerly prepared to double-down on rebuilding the Raptors by trading away Lowry to the New York Knicks. The Raptors didn’t appear to be a playoff team and Ujiri was still just six months into his demolition phase after inheriting Bryan Colangelo’s roster and also his coach in Dwane Casey. If Lowry was traded, firing Casey or simply letting him play out the final season of his contract was undoubtedly coming next.

Andrea Bargnani and Gay, the most burdensome contracts, were already unloaded at that point in December. Lowry was an expiring contract and considered a highly attractive asset for the Knicks since they simultaneously were pushing hard for a playoff spot with their draft pick already traded away while also preserving their long-term cap flexibility. Lowry didn’t fit in with the Raptors’ probably window of contention, especially not when the Raptors could get younger and deeper while picking up another draft pick.

Without Lowry, the plan for the Raptors was to move forward with a few young building blocks, cap space and hopefully be bad enough to get a top-5 pick in the Andrew Wiggins’ draft. Winning the lottery to draft Toronto-native Wiggins was to dream the impossible dream.

The rebuilding phase for the Raptors if they traded away Lowry would have been a quick dip to pick up one or two final difference-makers rather than the unpredictable drift of tanking. There was no need for a prolonged period of struggle when Jonas Valanciunas and Terrence Ross are under 24 on rookie contracts.

But that scenario never happened and that’s how they now have the best record in the Eastern Conference while ranking second in the NBA in both efficiency differential and offensive efficiency.

The Knicks were the recipient of Bargnani in June and that trade was already declared a win for Ujiri and the Raptors since they acquired a first round pick, and Bargnani was the Bargnani Toronto was so happy to see go. Dolan decided not to be fooled again by Ujiri, and the Raptors started winning at an elite pace with top-10 efficiency on both offense and defense. Lowry went from tough ass defensive ace to tough ass defensive ace who could all of a sudden carry the offense of a playoff team. Lowry first became a significantly better offensive player midway through the 10-11 season under Rick Adelman and he forced us all to amend the book on him after Casey gave him the most offensive authority and responsibility of his career. On the simplest of levels, Lowry just needed to become something to someone to become this good.

Lowry and DeRozan have become the conjoined extension of Ujiri on the floor in how to set the culture of the Raptors.

There’s certainly several point guards “better” than Lowry, but I’m picking him to run point to win me a single game on the streets of Philadelphia with my life in the balance. Lowry is too tough, smart and impassioned not to give you every chance possible.

After Lowry re-signed with the Raptors in July, they were still a 25 to 1 longshot bet to win the Eastern Conference. The implicit belief was that the Raptors were a superstar short of the Cavaliers’ three and also behind a Tom Thibodeau defense that could more efficiently score points with a newly acquired Pau Gasol and a newly healthy Derrick Rose. Beating the Wizards or Nets in the first round would mark a successful season.

Those expectations have justifiably recalibrated. But Ujiri is biding his time and insists the roster is at a point where they want to merely let the young players grow, but they’re also a 2004 Rasheed Wallace away from not just being April and May dangerous to also being June dangerous. Wallace was the final piece for those title-winning Pistons of 2004 who defeated a Lakers’ team with four Hall of Famers that couldn’t lose and his type of skill-set is the Raptors' biggest need as well.

Lowry’s mentor, Chauncey Billups, was Finals MVP after a similarly nomadic beginning to his career and was just one year younger at the time than Lowry is now. DeRozan is the same age as Richard Hamilton was in 2004; same with Terrence Ross and Tayshaun Prince. Bruno Caboclo is just a few months older than Darko Milicic was in 2004 if that could possibly matter to the symmetry.

Ujiri has a realistic opinion of his roster in continuing to play the long game, but those opportunities for improvement available to him are in the form of cap space and future picks, which is an unpredictable mistress even for any franchise a piece away. The Eastern Conference is also in a type of transition that may not exist for long, particularly with Lowry being this good.