A championship team needs someone who can protect the rim defensively and an elite shot-creator offensively. Occasionally, in the case of someone like Tim Duncan, one player can fill both roles.

However, as great as Dwight Howard is, he’s unlikely to ever be as polished offensively as Duncan. He needs someone who can create shots when he’s matched up against elite front-lines. Unfortunately, the Orlando Magic, over the cap and without any young players likely to develop into All-Stars or any significant trade assets besides Howard, don’t really have the means of acquiring one.

Because of this, their improbable run to the 2009 NBA Finals will likely be the highlight of Howard’s time in Orlando. History tells us the odds are against them; teams that lose in an NBA Finals rarely make it back and win. Since the Detroit Pistons won a championship in 1989, only two teams -- the 2009 Los Angeles Lakers and the 2011 Dallas Mavericks -- have recovered from a Finals loss to win it all.

You can trace Orlando's present day problem all the way back to Howard’s rookie season in 2004. Instead of bottoming out around their 19-year old franchise player, as Sam Presti did in Oklahoma City, they tried to remain somewhat competitive. The team’s top three scorers were Steve Francis (27), Grant Hill (32) and Cuttino Mobley (29). As a result, Orlando’s record was 36-46, and they received the #11 pick in the 2005 NBA Draft.

The top of the lottery is the best place to find All-Star caliber talent; the Magic blew their best chance to acquire a player who could complement Howard by winning so many games in his first two seasons. In 2005, they selected Spanish big man Fran Vazquez, who has never played in the NBA; in the same spot in 2006, they selected JJ Redick, a Duke star who has turned himself into a valuable role player.

By his third season, Howard had improved enough to the point where the Magic made the playoffs. Their window was closed; they have not had a lottery pick since.

The other way a team can build around a star player is free agency, but that time is limited as well, because once a player of Howard’s caliber is no longer on his rookie salary, his maximum salary makes it difficult to add elite free-agent talent.

Before Howard’s fourth season, Orlando signed Rashard Lewis to a 6-year $118 million contract. He was supposed to be the missing piece, and they were all-in with a core of Lewis, Hedo Turkoglu and Jameer Nelson around Howard. People have called Lewis’ signing the Magic’s “Original Sin”, because it was a decision that doomed the Magic to their current path, a decision that no amount of work in the time since could overcome.

Orlando was an extremely unconventional team, playing two 6’10 shooters (Lewis and Turkoglu) in the front-court to space the floor around Howard, and depending on Turkoglu and Nelson to provide just enough offensive balance from the perimeter. In the 2009 playoffs, Turkoglu stepped in for an injured Nelson, using his unique ball-handling and passing ability at 6’10 230 to give the Magic just enough offense to get by a Boston Celtics team without Kevin Garnett and a one-man Cleveland Cavaliers squad.

But in the NBA Finals, with the Lakers able to single-cover Howard with their cadre of seven-footers, Turkoglu’s short-comings were exposed. While he averaged 16 points and five assists in those playoffs, he did it on only 42.7% shooting.

He’s not skilled enough to score efficiently on defenders that are as long and as fast he is; both Trevor Ariza and Lamar Odom could safely attack his dribble while still contesting his fade-aways. As a result, Orlando’s offense failed them at the most crucial times: they scored a total of 12 points in the overtime sessions of Games 2 and 4 of those Finals.

Knowing Turkoglu was miscast as a primary offensive option on a championship team, Magic GM Otis Smith rolled the dice on Vince Carter. But after Carter’s disappointing performance in the 2010 Eastern Conference Finals, he gambled again, using backup center Marcin Gortat as bait to dump Carter’s contract and acquire Turkoglu and Jason Richardson. At the same time, he swapped Lewis’ contract for Gilbert Arenas’ even more preposterous one.

It was an audacious gamble. He was depending on Howard to single-handedly cover the team’s multitude of defensive flaws and hoping that a group of one-dimensional scorers could make up for the absence of an All-Star caliber player on the perimeter. And considering Smith’s other options at the time, it wasn’t a bad one.

Unfortunately, it didn’t work either. The Hawks had a massive seven-footer in Jason Collins who could handle Howard’s bulk, and they dared Nelson, Turkoglu, Arenas and Richardson to beat them without the benefit of sending their men to double-team Howard. Arenas shot 42.9% from the field in that series, while Turkoglu (29.4%), Richardson (33.3%) and Nelson (37.8%) were even worse.

Orlando already has $74.8 million in payroll committed for next season, yet they don’t really have any trade assets to speak of. And even if there is an amnesty clause in the new CBA, the Magic still aren’t going to be under the cap enough to be a player in free agency.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the army you have, not one you might wish or want to have at a later time.” With one more year to impress Dwight Howard before he enters unrestricted free agency, the Magic have no choice but to go to war with the team they have, a team not good enough to convince him to stay in Orlando.

They made a series of crippling mistakes from 2004-2007 when they had the chance to acquire the pieces necessary to build a championship team. In the summer of 2012, they will have to pay the final price for them.