RealGM Analysis
Even though starting the season on time was never that important to either side, neither the players nor the owners want to lose it entirely. As a result, with a deal in reach that would force both to compromise, the CBA negotiations have come down to an incredibly dangerous game of high-stakes chicken.
The lockout is a classic example of the hawk/dove dilemma behind the children’s game. Whoever yields first loses, yet both sides lose if neither does.
In the game, if two cars are on a crash-course, the driver who swerves out of the way “loses”. To win, a driver has to convince the other he won’t and count on the other to lose his nerve. The best way to do that is to remove the steering wheel from your car and throw it out the window, but the more you exaggerate your irrationality, the less room you have to maneuver.
On one side, there is a group of hardline owners, led by Michael Jordan, demanding David Stern drop the BRI split below 50/50 and take back the system concessions the owners have already given up. Stern has warned the union if there’s no deal by November 9, he’ll let the hardliners steer the car.
On the other, there is a growing group of players, led by Paul Pierce, trying to decertify the union rather than drop below 52 percent of BRI and accept a harsher luxury tax system that would threaten players’ guaranteed contracts.
Because the owners have an effective monopoly on professional basketball in the United States, the NBA’s many labor restrictions -- a reverse order-draft, a salary cap and numerous other limits on player compensation -- all need to be collectively bargained. If the players disband the union and represent themselves individually, the entire structure of the CBA is vulnerable to an anti-trust lawsuit.
The NFLPA tried this tactic earlier this year, and the issue was still tied up in the courts when the NFL owners ended their lockout. A legal battle over the issue would take years to dissolve, and no one knows who would win. But if the players did, the owners could be responsible for punitive damages up to three times the players’ losses, which could end up in the billions of dollars.
The difference is the owners have allowed their hardliners to control the debate from the beginning. After offering an absurdly draconian proposal, they didn’t even bother negotiating for almost two months. A month ago, at the deadline for starting the season on time, they abruptly ended negotiations by unilaterally offering a deal nearly as bad as their initial one.
They knew they had the financial leverage on the players, and they made it clear they intended to use it, even at the cost of an entire season. In contrast, the players union never seriously contemplated decertifying before the last few weeks, with Billy Hunter preferring to challenge the owners’ bargaining stance in a complaint to the NLRB (National Labor Relations Board).
But the owners never took the NLRB threat seriously, perhaps because the board has been hamstrung by a lack of political appointees since 2007. Decertification, on the other hand, would open up a legal can of worms they can’t ignore.
By shelving their hardliners, the players have won the public relations battle; by empowering theirs, the owners have moved the negotiations’ “Overton Window” as far to their side as possible. In pushing so relentlessly for a maximal position, they’ve made the structure of any possible compromise very owner-friendly: a massive salary roll-back which weakens players’ contract guarantees even though the league has been growing rapidly in the midst of a severe recession. In the same way, Bill O’Reilly became the voice of moderation at Fox News when they added Glenn Beck in 2009.
But, as Fox News found out when they were forced to let go of Beck, the problem with enabling extremists is that it’s very difficult to control them. Now, with time running out to save the season, both Stern and Hunter will have to manage the egos of their most intransigent constituents as the pressure on both increases. Their metaphorical cars are closer to each other than ever before, and they are no longer the only ones at the wheel.
The good thing about playing chicken is that it can force both sides to compromise by offering an even more unpleasant alternative. The bad thing is that it re-frames the negotiations completely: instead of being partners looking to grow the game of basketball, the owners and the players have become enemies at each other’s throats.
The players waited five months to use the threat of decertification, forgoing their leverage in an effort to get a deal done. They won’t make the same mistake next time. Playing chicken has poisoned the relationship between the two sides: whatever happens in 2011, 2018 or 2021 is likely to be much worse.
The lockout is a classic example of the hawk/dove dilemma behind the children’s game. Whoever yields first loses, yet both sides lose if neither does.
In the game, if two cars are on a crash-course, the driver who swerves out of the way “loses”. To win, a driver has to convince the other he won’t and count on the other to lose his nerve. The best way to do that is to remove the steering wheel from your car and throw it out the window, but the more you exaggerate your irrationality, the less room you have to maneuver.
On one side, there is a group of hardline owners, led by Michael Jordan, demanding David Stern drop the BRI split below 50/50 and take back the system concessions the owners have already given up. Stern has warned the union if there’s no deal by November 9, he’ll let the hardliners steer the car.
On the other, there is a growing group of players, led by Paul Pierce, trying to decertify the union rather than drop below 52 percent of BRI and accept a harsher luxury tax system that would threaten players’ guaranteed contracts.
Because the owners have an effective monopoly on professional basketball in the United States, the NBA’s many labor restrictions -- a reverse order-draft, a salary cap and numerous other limits on player compensation -- all need to be collectively bargained. If the players disband the union and represent themselves individually, the entire structure of the CBA is vulnerable to an anti-trust lawsuit.
The NFLPA tried this tactic earlier this year, and the issue was still tied up in the courts when the NFL owners ended their lockout. A legal battle over the issue would take years to dissolve, and no one knows who would win. But if the players did, the owners could be responsible for punitive damages up to three times the players’ losses, which could end up in the billions of dollars.
The difference is the owners have allowed their hardliners to control the debate from the beginning. After offering an absurdly draconian proposal, they didn’t even bother negotiating for almost two months. A month ago, at the deadline for starting the season on time, they abruptly ended negotiations by unilaterally offering a deal nearly as bad as their initial one.
They knew they had the financial leverage on the players, and they made it clear they intended to use it, even at the cost of an entire season. In contrast, the players union never seriously contemplated decertifying before the last few weeks, with Billy Hunter preferring to challenge the owners’ bargaining stance in a complaint to the NLRB (National Labor Relations Board).
But the owners never took the NLRB threat seriously, perhaps because the board has been hamstrung by a lack of political appointees since 2007. Decertification, on the other hand, would open up a legal can of worms they can’t ignore.
By shelving their hardliners, the players have won the public relations battle; by empowering theirs, the owners have moved the negotiations’ “Overton Window” as far to their side as possible. In pushing so relentlessly for a maximal position, they’ve made the structure of any possible compromise very owner-friendly: a massive salary roll-back which weakens players’ contract guarantees even though the league has been growing rapidly in the midst of a severe recession. In the same way, Bill O’Reilly became the voice of moderation at Fox News when they added Glenn Beck in 2009.
But, as Fox News found out when they were forced to let go of Beck, the problem with enabling extremists is that it’s very difficult to control them. Now, with time running out to save the season, both Stern and Hunter will have to manage the egos of their most intransigent constituents as the pressure on both increases. Their metaphorical cars are closer to each other than ever before, and they are no longer the only ones at the wheel.
The good thing about playing chicken is that it can force both sides to compromise by offering an even more unpleasant alternative. The bad thing is that it re-frames the negotiations completely: instead of being partners looking to grow the game of basketball, the owners and the players have become enemies at each other’s throats.
The players waited five months to use the threat of decertification, forgoing their leverage in an effort to get a deal done. They won’t make the same mistake next time. Playing chicken has poisoned the relationship between the two sides: whatever happens in 2011, 2018 or 2021 is likely to be much worse.
