Most experts seem to have Louisville in their preseason Top 10 next year. And because people need to justify that ranking, between now and November you are going to be hearing a lot about Louisville recruit, point guard Chris Jones. Jones is the top junior college player in the country, and everyone is saying he will be an instant impact recruit. (Besides Chris Jones, some of the other top JUCO recruits this year include SMU’s Yanick Moreira, Marquette’s Jameel McKay, and Missouri’s Keanau Post.)

But what is a reasonable expectation for a top JUCO recruit? For many of us, we simply want to see Jones play before we draw any conclusions. Scouting is hugely important, and I wouldn’t be watching the Jordan Brand Classic and writing about it, if I didn’t see value in watching players and picturing how they will fit into an offense.

But if you want to look at the historical stats and use those to predict how Chris Jones might play, that is what today’s column is all about.  But before I share those numbers, let me point out that the biggest problem with junior college players is attrition. JUCO players are systematically more likely to have problems with eligibility, systematically more likely to withdraw at the start of the school year, and systematically more likely not to make it through the entire season. I thought this post by John Templon of NYBuckets summed it up rather nicely. Below I am only presenting the numbers for players that enrolled successfully and played more minutes than a typical walk-on. Only 77% of Top 100 JUCO players met this criteria, meaning my sample suffered a 23% attrition rate. Because of this, the most important hurdle for Louisville may be making sure Chris Jones is on the court on November 1^st.

Second, I think it is important to set a baseline for expectations for incoming players. I’m going to use freshmen as that baseline. The next table is a recreation of a table Luke Winn made a few years ago, measuring the first year impact of various freshmen. The only difference here is that I am using 11 years of data, from 2003 to 2013. Remarkably, the expectations are quite similar in the expanded data set.

Occasionally, a team of freshmen come together and dominate from Day 1, but this year’s Michigan squad was definitely an outlier. More realistically, only the highest rated freshmen tend to come in and dominate the first year they step on campus.

Now, in last year’s preseason rankings, I didn’t do much with the JUCO data. About the only fact I used was this one: From 2005 to 2013, JUCO transfers into Power programs have performed better than JUCO transfers into smaller programs.

I typically view JUCO players as emergency fill-ins. A JUCO player can come in and get you a 97.0 ORtg on average, which is better than the 94.3 for an unranked freshman. But it isn’t a lot better.

When I published my preseason rankings last year, one of the initial suggestions I received was that I should use the JUCO Top 100 data and see if it provided some additional information with which to form expectations. As it turns out, over 80% of the JUCO players enrolling in Power 6 conferences were ranked in the JUCO Top 100. (An example of a JUCO player outside the Top 100 at a major program would be Cincinnati’s David Nyarsuk.)  I have now coded that Top 100 data, and the next table shows how the JUCO Top 100 have fared in their debut seasons. For 2011 and 2012, I am using the JUCO rankings found on Jucorecruiting.com. From 2007-2010, I am using the JUCO rankings created by Juco Junction, a division of rivals.com.

I didn’t break out the Top 100 further because the variance for these players is huge. Using six years of data, none of the tiers of data are statistically significantly different from one another. To put it another way, when you plot efficiency relative to the JUCO ranking, the data is virtually a scatter plot. There are players at all points in the rankings with efficiency ratings below 90 and above 110. I’m not completely sure why the JUCO rankings have so little predictive power. It could be the differences in competition, the lower quality of scouting, or simply the different circumstances these players walk into. (I.e. a JUCO player matriculating at Texas Tech and Marquette probably faces a substantially different probability of success.)

That said, I think it is fair to say the Top 10 JUCO recruits look very similar to freshmen recruits ranked 21-30 out of high school. If you want to set your expectation for Chris Jones at 101.5 based on this data, that seems reasonable.

You might argue that my Top 10 cut-off is too wide. Maybe if I just focused on the Top 5 or Top 3, we would get an even higher expectation for a player like Chris Jones. But the data don’t really support that. If we cut off players ranked 6-10, we cut out some of the best JUCO players to go D1. You would be dropping Mississippi’s Marshall Henderson (#10 in 2012) and LSU’s Marcus Thornton(#6 in 2007) among others. And unfortunately, a number of players near the top of the JUCO rankings have bombed badly. Do you remember that Mario Little and Tyrone Appleton were ranked #1 and #3 in the JUCO rankings before attending Kansas in 2009? They did nothing. The #2 JUCO recruit in 2007 Nemanja Calasan had a dreadful 88.1 ORtg for Purdue. The #2 JUCO recruit in 2011 Kansas St.’s Freddy Asprilla was little better at 91.2.

Wichita St.’s Cleanthony Early (#2 in 2013), Missouri’s Ricardo Ratliffe (#1 in 2011), and Baylor’s Pierre Jackson (#1 in 2012) were all brilliant college players. So there are clearly some success stories. But do not let the positive outcomes for those players cause you to be overly optimistic about Louisville’s Chris Jones. Because for every Pierre Jackson, there is 2012 #2 JUCO Nurideen Lindsey, who posted an 83.8 ORtg before transferring out of St. John’s. I should also add that PG is notoriously the hardest position to play well immediately.

Probably the best thing Louisville’s Chris Jones has going for him is that Rick Pitino believes in him. If Pitino thinks he can compete and possibly start immediately, expectations should be pretty high. At this point, I see Jones as having a slightly higher expected value than Louisville’s other incoming PG, Terry Rozier. Rozier was the #75 RSCI recruit out of high school before spending a year at prep school. But I would expect them both to play. My model has Jones playing 55% of the minutes and Rozier playing 45% of the minutes.

Without Russ Smith, my predictions model currently has Louisville 15^th nationally. With Russ Smith, my model would now have Louisville 3^rd, behind only Kentucky (with the greatest recruiting class of all time) and Michigan St. (assuming Adreian Payne and Gary Harris return.) 15^th may seem unreasonably low, but remember that Russ Smith was Ken Pomeroy’s player of the year as the most important tempo free player, so obviously his loss is going to hurt in any model that relies on tempo free stats. Personally, I think 15^th may be a little low. But it all comes down to what you are trying to measure. My model has Iowa slightly ahead of Louisville right now. Iowa almost certainly has less of a chance of being an elite team or national title contender than Louisville. But Iowa had the 23^rd best margin-of-victory numbers last year, returns basically its entire rotation, and has little chance of a disastrous season. I think most people tend to make their predictions at least partly based on upside, and I won’t argue with Louisville in the 8-12 range in most people’s rankings.

Overall, the top JUCO recruits can be dominant players. But much like freshmen recruits outside the Top 20, there are no guarantees.

On Sunday, in his first game without Kobe Bryant, Dwight Howard had 26 points, 17 rebounds and 3 blocks on 9-15 shooting. With the Los Angeles Lakers needing a win over the Spurs to stay alive in the playoff race, Howard outdueled Tim Duncan in the type of one-on-one post battle rarely seen in the modern NBA. He didn’t have quite the lift or mobility of his days with the Orlando Magic, but it was closer to what most expected when he came to Los Angeles. Given the inconsistent way Howard and the Lakers have played, it’s hard to know what to expect from them on Wednesday, when they could be in another win or go home scenario. Nevertheless, no matter what happens, there’s room for optimism for a team with a 6’11+ center capable of a 26/17 game.

Unless something dramatic happens in the final week of the regular season, the Oklahoma City Thunder will be the No. 1 seed in the Western Conference. If the Lakers make the playoffs, it’s hard to see them making much noise against Oklahoma City, even if they had Bryant. Ignore the vast differences in record and point differential and the matchups are still terrible. Oklahoma City has two 6’10+ post players capable of banging with Howard and Pau Gasol and a 6’7+ perimeter stopper (Thabo Sefolosha) who would have made Kobe work for his points. On the other side of the ball, the Lakers don’t have the perimeter speed to bother Kevin Durant or Russell Westbrook. Sending Steve Blake or a hobbled Steve Nash out to face Westbrook is like feeding a Christian to the lions.

Looking back now, the preseason expectations for the Lakers seem a bit foolish. They were an extremely top-heavy team with little depth and no continuity. Howard, coming off major back surgery, was the only one of their starting five in his twenties. With so much age on the floor, the Lakers needed a still hobbled Howard to be Superman, at least on the defensive end. Maybe things would have been different if everyone had been healthy, but it shouldn’t have been a huge surprise that Kobe (34), Nash (38), Gasol (32) and Metta World Peace (33) all missed significant time, especially considering how many minutes they had to play. It’s no coincidence the Knicks, the oldest team in the NBA, were also rocked with injuries.

But while the injuries to their top players may have been unavoidable, their lack of depth wasn’t. The Lakers team speed on the perimeter has been a glaring issue for three years, since Jason Terry and J.J. Barea steamrolled them out of the playoffs in 2011. Strangely enough, a franchise that had no problem racking up a $100 million payroll began pinching pennies when it came to upgrading the back end of their rotation. Chris Duhon and Steve Blake were solid pros in their day, but there’s no excuse for carrying two guards in their 30’s with PER’s under 12. Mitch Kupchak could have found better role-playing perimeter players in Europe, the D-League or under a couch cushion.

Regardless of what happens to their star players this offseason, upgrading their bench should be a priority. With so many offensive weapons already in place and a stable of competent big men, all the Lakers need are a “3-and-D” players at PG, SG and SF. Even without a first-round pick, they shouldn’t be too hard to find. After all, L.A. could have had Patrick Beverley, Alan Anderson and Chris Copeland for nothing at various points in the last two years. The talent pool for professional basketball players worldwide is at an all-time high; there are a number of players in Europe who could help the Lakers right now. Ignoring them in favor of aging veterans with NBA experience is akin to a starving man not picking up a $100 bill lying on the ground.

Of course, the first priority will be re-signing Howard to a max contract. While several other teams could make a run for him, it’s hard to imagine him leaving the Lakers. Star players rarely leave the biggest stage in their sport, whether it’s the Lakers, the New York Yankees or the Dallas Cowboys. If Howard went to Dallas or Atlanta, he’d be taking less money to play for a worse team in a smaller market. His reputation has taken a tremendous hit in the last two seasons, but he’s already reached rock bottom in L.A. If he wins a championship all will be forgiven and there’s no better place to do it than with the Lakers.

Re-signing Howard would push their payroll north of $90 million, which is why talk of amnestying Kobe Bryant is a red herring. Even without his $30 million salary on the books, the Lakers would still be over the salary cap, so it wouldn’t give them much more flexibility. From a strictly financial perspective, it’s hard to imagine a 35-year old shooting guard coming off an Achilles injury being worth the price the Lakers will pay for him, even if he does come back earlier than expected. It will be up to Jim and Jeanie Buss to determine whether the $80 million they could save in luxury tax penalties will be worth the massive PR hit.

Either way, the Lakers can’t afford to make too many changes in 2013, not with the summer of 2014 right around the corner. Right now, Steve Nash is the only player on the books and he could easily retire after his age-39 season. If they re-sign Howard and don’t take on any long-term salary, L.A. could make a hard push for some combination of LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, Carmelo Anthony or Dirk Nowitzki. Kevin Love, who played college basketball at UCLA and may be looking for a new home, could be available as well. The rules are different for a team in Los Angeles, New York or Miami; those are the three markets where clearing out cap space is actually a viable long-term strategy.

The Lakers will have to make some hard decisions on Kobe, Pau and Earl Clark, but they won’t make or break the franchise. No matter who is around him, if Howard can be as dominant as he was in Orlando, L.A. could be a title contender next season. Even if he never fully recovers, which is always a possibility for a guy with 10 NBA seasons under his belt, a 28-year-old center who can average 20/10 and contribute on both sides of the ball is an excellent start to a rebuilding effort. In an increasingly perimeter-oriented league bereft of great centers, Howard is the one player who can stand in LeBron’s way. That’s why, after all the dust clears from an incredibly tumultuous season in L.A., Howard is still the great “known unknown” for both the Lakers and the NBA.

Before their 102-91 victory on Wednesday, the Phoenix Suns had not beaten the Dallas Mavericks in Dallas since 2007. That game, a wild 129-127 double-overtime shootout between two high-octane offenses, was the highpoint of one of the most exciting rivalries in the NBA. With Steve Nash and Dirk Nowitzki squaring off, every matchup between Dallas and Phoenix was must-see TV. Six years later, there are few late-season games more depressing than a meeting between these two franchises. In the NBA, if you can’t sell wins, you sell hope. It’s hard to have much hope for below .500 teams giving so many minutes to players in their thirties.

For both, the road to mediocrity began when they lost their All-Star big man in free agency. Re-signing either Amar’e Stoudemire or Tyson Chandler would have been a gamble, but the bigger one was losing that type of asset without getting anything in return. The Suns went from going to the Western Conference Finals with Amar’e to missing the playoffs; the Mavs went from winning a title with Chandler to being swept out of the first round. They didn’t realize it at the time, but they were essentially committing themselves to a rebuilding process with a franchise player in his mid-thirties. And without much young talent on either team’s roster this season, there’s no telling when that process will end.

Ever since Robert Sarver bought the Suns, they have had a penny wise, pound foolish attitude towards the draft. From 2004-2008, they sold the rights to the picks that became Luol Deng, Rudy Fernandez, Rajon Rondo, Nate Robinson, Serge Ibaka and Wilson Chandler. Instead of embracing the value of securing talented young players on cost-controlled deals, they sweated giving someone on the end of their bench a guaranteed contract. As a result, as Nash got older and Amar’e began breaking down, there wasn’t a Tiago Splitter or a Kawhi Leonard around to pick up the slack.

The Mavs haven’t gotten a player out of the draft since Devin Harris in 2004. It hasn’t been a question of money; they actually bought a first round pick in 2010. Unfortunately, they used it on Dominique Jones, a third-year guard already languishing in the D-League. A lot of teams draft players who need two or three stops before they stick in the NBA; the Mavs draft players who wash out of the league as soon as their rookie contract ends. Maurice Ager, their first-round pick in 2006, played in 82 total games in his NBA career. There’s a good chance Rodrigue Beaubois, their first-round pick in 2009, never plays in the league again.

While it’s hard to draft well in the latter stages of the first round, that’s the only way all but a select few franchises can replenish their talent pool. The Spurs consistently find contributors with picks worse than the Mavs or the Suns have had. Drafting basketball players isn’t the game of chance that many GM’s like to pretend; there are certain teams that have been counting cards for years. Just follow the San Antonio front office tree, from Oklahoma City (Sam Presti) to Charlotte (Rich Cho) and Orlando (Rob Henningan). All those guys have proven they can evaluate young talent, which is more than you can say for the front office in Dallas or Phoenix.

Without any young building blocks, both teams had to dive head-first into the morass that is free agency. It’s possible to fit an undervalued free agent into your system (see: Tony Allen in Memphis), but giving out big contracts to guys who aren’t superstars is usually an invitation to pay for someone else’s problem. The Suns used the cap space created by Amare’s departure to bring in Josh Childress, Hakim Warrick, Hedo Turkoglu and Mickael Pietrus. And while their world-class medical team has squeezed production out of guys like O’Neal, Grant Hill and Michael Redd, what good is a player (literally) on his last legs to a rebuilding organization? There’s no point in having a mentor for young guys who won’t stick in the NBA.

The Mavs, at least, have had the decency not to commit long-term to a bunch of mid-level free agents. Chris Kaman, on a one-year $8 million contract, has the highest usage rating on the team and the lowest assist rate. On the other side of the floor, he plays defense at about the level you would expect for a lumbering 7’0 270 center on the wrong side of 30. OJ Mayo, who has a $4 million player option for next season, remains as inconsistent as ever, with a jumper that comes and goes and wildly varying levels of decision-making and defensive intensity. Here’s all you need to know about Darren Collison: in his last season before unrestricted free agency, he lost his starting job to a 37-year-old with a 9.1 PER.

What has to be most concerning about a lost season in Dallas and Phoenix is the lack of progress from their rookies. Kendall Marshall, whom the Suns drafted at No. 14 overall, has looked completely lost. He’s got good size and passing instincts for a PG, but he’s a poor shooter and a below average athlete. He has the game, athleticism and hairline of a guy 10 years his senior. Jared Cunningham, a shooting guard from Oregon State whom the Mavs drafted at No. 24, has barely seen the floor. His D-League stats might explain why: he’s a 6’4 200 guard who can’t shoot or run point.

It’s far too soon to give up on either, but the holes in their game were evident in college. Marshall played with four future first-round picks at UNC: Tyler Zeller, John Henson, Harrison Barnes and Reggie Bullock. It’s pretty easy for a pass-first PG to look good in that environment. Yet even with all the defensive attention his teammates drew, he averaged only 8 points on 47% shooting. Cunningham, the best player on a team that went 7-11 in the Pac-12, was a clear reach in the late first-round. To the extent he succeeded in college, it was by being the best athlete on the floor, which won’t be enough at the next level.

With the importance of the draft magnified by the new CBA, both teams have to turn some draft picks into home runs. Cunningham and Marshall don’t even qualify as getting on base. For the Suns, it became a worst of both worlds situation with Nash: they were too emotionally attached to pull the plug and he was too good to be on a bottom-feeder. As a result, they hovered around .500 for two more seasons without getting any younger. The Mavs are one more failed offseason before they are facing that exact scenario with Dirk, who will be 35 in three months. There was only so long Dallas and Phoenix could paper over their inability to find and develop young talent. This season, those chickens have come home to roost.